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ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
China’s goals in the South China Sea are twofold: to expand sovereignty while
keeping the peace. I argue this is accomplished through rhetorical strategic ambiguity and
military clarity, which have characterized China’s maritime grand strategy since 2010.
Using confusion and clarity—two seemingly opposite strategies—allows China to
simultaneously expand sovereignty and maintain peace. This paper first introduces the
literature and theory behind grand strategy and strategic ambiguity. It then demonstrates
how China’s intentions are made clear through military actions, then shows that China’s
rhetoric is ambiguous to members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
by weighing evidence that China is unintentional in its ambiguity against evidence
showing this is a deliberate strategy.
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INTRODUCTION
What is China’s “grand strategy”? The search for this “grand strategy” incites
heated debate among Chinese and Western academics and policymakers alike. Within the
study of international relations, this search for an overarching strategy is nuanced and
inconclusive partly because of the multifaceted nature of Chinese foreign policy. Each
aspect of Chinese foreign policy has a specific doctrine. Foreign policy components are
intertwined with domestic policy and range from evolving nuclear principles to Xi
Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (Rolland 2017). Among these tenants of foreign policy,
the maritime domain is most relevant to the current security environment. Within the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), many recognize that the “main threat of war has
already shifted…to the ocean direction” because of territorial disputes in the South China
Sea (McCaslin and Erickson 2019). In the West, media is rife with fears of an
increasingly belligerent and overconfident China.1 Clarifying China’s tactics and
intentions in the South China Sea is crucial to maintaining regional stability and friendly
US-China relations.
China’s goals in the South China Sea are twofold: to expand sovereignty while
keeping the peace. I argue this is accomplished through rhetorical strategic ambiguity and
military clarity, which have characterized China’s maritime grand strategy since 2010.
Using confusion and clarity—two seemingly opposite strategies—allows China to
simultaneously expand sovereignty and maintain peace. This paper first introduces the
1

For examples, see Michael Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China” or the 2019 U.S. Department of
Defense China Military Report. In 2013, Alastair Johnston argued the academic trend of pointing out
China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric underestimates the amount of aggressive rhetoric present before
the 2010 era. He argues that there has not been an increase in aggressive rhetoric. However, this analysis
predates Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, China’s dismissal of the 2016 UNCLOS arbitration in favor
of the Philippines, and increasingly aggressive acts in the South China Sea.
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literature and theory behind grand strategy and strategic ambiguity. It then demonstrates
how China’s intentions are made clear through military actions, then shows that China’s
rhetoric is ambiguous to members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
by weighing evidence that China is unintentional in its ambiguity against evidence
showing this is a deliberate strategy.
Many sources agree there is ambiguity in China’s approach to ASEAN countries
in the South China Sea, yet there is surprising silence in academic research on whether
China’s ambiguity is intentional. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
conference report on South China Sea issues describes “palpable tension as…Chinese
experts attempted to defend Beijing’s positions…note the plural ‘positions’ because there
was scant agreement as to what precisely the Chinese position is” (Poling 2012).
Strategists at reputable think tanks and universities discuss the impacts of China’s
strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea on ASEAN countries without first clearly
establishing whether it exists (for examples, see The Diplomat, “How China Maintains
Strategic Ambiguity in the South China Sea,” Nanyang University Richard A. Bitzinger’s
speech on “The Challenge of Strategic Ambiguity in Asia”). This paper contributes to the
current body of literature by systemically addressing the persistent assumption that
China’s ambiguity is strategic.
This paper is limited in scope in several ways. First, I do not argue strategic
ambiguity is China’s overarching policy or that it defines China’s North Korea policy,
nuclear policy, and military ambitions. There is already established literature exploring
this possibility (Yu 2018; Shen CSIS; Mathiel and Schell 2013). Second, I focus solely
on strategic ambiguity and exclude important models for understanding regional
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attitudes, such as a reciprocity model of ASEAN’s reactions to China’s strategic
ambiguity, as this paper intends to isolate strategic ambiguity to strengthen further
research utilizing these other models.
I assume throughout this paper that China’s objective in the South China Sea is to
avoid military conflict while expanding influence. China is not looking for a military
provocation as the costs outweigh the benefits (Fravel 2010; Fravel, Roy, Swaine, et al.,
2019; Godwin and Miller 2013, 17). China’s security strategy goes beyond diplomacy—
political, economic, and defense components factor into Beijing’s calculations (Howard
2001). Indeed, China is fully integrated into global and regional institutions of trade,
commerce, and security, and depends on a globalized economy and active membership in
Asia’s multilateral security organizations. Furthermore, many argue China’s military lags
behind world class militaries and has not yet completed its military modernization
process and thus provoking conflict would be premature (China’s National Defense 2019,
6). Indeed, one ASEAN member seems to dismiss the idea of a violent China. In response
to a provocation in 2013, Malaysia’s Defense Minister stated, “just because you have
enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies …the Chinese can patrol every day,
but if their intention is not to go to war it is of less concern” (Lai 2017).2
WHAT IS CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY?
What is a grand strategy? The definition of a grand strategy has expanded and
diminished over time. A lack of consensus on the definition of a grand strategy
complicates finding China’s grand strategy. Scholars and statesmen alike agree
articulating China’s grand strategy is necessary but disagree whether China has an overall

Some would argue a lack of Malaysian response to this provocation was more inability more than
unwillingness (Lai 2017).
2
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grand strategy and how this would apply to the maritime domain (Stenstile 2014). For
instance, Eric Hyer argues pragmaticism is a key characteristic of its grand strategy while
others characterize the same observation and evidence as a lack of a grand strategy (Hyer
2015; Stenslie 2014).
Opinions can roughly be divided into several schools. Some argue a grand
strategy does not exist. Wang Jisi of Peking University influentially argued in 2011 that
China’s grand strategy is a “field still to be plowed.” Others see Xi Jinping thought as
revealing broad strategic direction but not as a grand strategy because China might have
“too many strategies to be strategic” (for examples of those in this school see: Stanzel,
Rolland, Jacob and Hart 2017; Yi, Levine and Liu 2011; Wang Jisi 2011; Stenslie 2014;
Jackobson 2014).
Others argue China has a bolder grand strategy than any other country because of
the consistency of China’s defense and foreign policy (Erickson 2019, 73; Friedberg
2012). A school of Chinese scholars emphasizes China’s return to power as opposed to
its rise to power as its “grand strategy” (Yan Xuetong’s book Ancient Chinese Thought
reviews this school). Other Western theorists view China’s “prudence and patience” as
the defining characteristic of China’s grand strategy and use Xi Jinping’s departure from
Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “hide your strength and bid your time” to show China is
preparing to reap the benefits of its patience (examples include Jacques 2009; Brzezinski
2012). When Hu Jintao was in office, some argued that China’s strategy was one of
“reassurance.” This strategy aimed to cement China’s place in the international
economic order and prevent other countries from hedging against China (Golstein 2005;
Fravel 2010, 510). Still others argue China’s national security priorities are something

4

akin to a Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, with larger goals such as protecting party
leadership, dwarfing smaller objectives, such as addressing far seas interests (Erickson
2019, 73). The prolific literature and lack of consensus among Western and Chinese
scholars alike illustrates the centrality of finding China’s grand strategy to understanding
“how Beijing will flex its muscles” in the 21st century (Shambaugh and Xiao 2012, 36).
I use the realist definition posed by Posen and Walt in the 1980s. These realists
narrowly define a grand strategy as a “set of hypotheses or predictions that can explain
how a country can ‘cause’ security for itself. If a country does A, B or C, then X, Y and Z
will follow.” I use this definition as it creates a succinct and simple hypothesis. This
definition leads to the following hypothetical statement: If China adopts strategic
ambiguity towards in the South China Sea, then China will be able to maintain its
maritime territory and expand in the South China Sea while maintaining peace.
Furthermore, much contemporary literature on China’s boundary strategies is rooted in
realist strategy.3 Using a definition consistent with the dominant theory helps frame this
discussion in the context of much other Western literature.
MILITARY ACTIONS
This section argues China is transparent about its intentions through its actions. It
is particularly clear about how it expects ASEAN countries to act but muddies its own
ground rules and intentions.
Beijing continuously emphasizes the importance of sovereignty in the South
China Sea in its national agenda. During the 19th Communist Party of China’s (CPC)
Party Congress, Xi Jinping highlighted the construction on South China Sea islands and

3

See the introduction of Eric Hyer’s book The Pragmatic Dragon: China’s Grand Strategy for a
comprehensive review of the realist approaches to China’s boundary disputes.
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reefs and urged greater efforts to “protect China’s sovereignty” (Full Text 2017).
Policymakers in Beijing have clearly signaled to the international community that
asserting sovereignty in the South China Sea is a high priority. This is evident in the July
2019 China’s National Defense in the New Era document intended to help the
“international community understand China’s national defense,” which places
safeguarding China’s maritime rights on equal footing with policies such as cracking
down on proponents of separatist movements and safeguarding national social stability
(China’s National Defense 2019, 4).
The “Three Nos”
When communicating with ASEAN (particularly with the Philippines and
Vietnam), China has made “Three Nos” very clear: no balancing, no international appeals
and no drilling for oil without Beijing’s help. China has shown that it does not want
ASEAN countries balancing against it in two primary ways. First, China has aggressively
indicated it will only engage in bilateral talks to solve country specific maritime disputes.
While China has engaged in multilateral talks with ASEAN countries to draft a Code of
Conduct (CoC) since 2002, the CoC provides general outlines of how to act in the South
China Sea and serves as an opportunity for China to assert the rules that it wants others to
abide by and not boundary demarcations. China is more concerned over ASEAN
countries working together without its participation.
One way of preventing ASEAN from working together is through using the
security-economic nexus by using economic pressure to push a security agenda (National
Institute 2019; Friedberg 1991, 265).4 Perhaps the most widely cited instance of this is

4

Beijing also overtly points out this security-economic nexus. A May 2016 People’s Daily article directly
tells Vietnam to “weight in the question of guns versus butter.”
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the 2012 ASEAN summit held in Phenom Penh where, for the first time in 45 years,
foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communiqué on issues of concern to ASEAN.
After looking at drafts submitted by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam,
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong consulted with advisors outside the room
and returned with edits rejecting language referring to the Scarborough Shoal (in dispute
with the Philippines), commenting that these were bilateral issues and not appropriate for
a joint statement. The suggested comments and opinion that these were bilateral issues
suspiciously aligned with Chinese views on the issue, and reports by those present
suggest that Hor Nam Hong was sharing the suggested document with Chinese
interlocutors outside of the conference room. Incidentally, a few days later, China
promised Cambodia U.S. $500 million in aid and loans. China used its economic clout to
“press Cambodia into the awkward position of standing up to its ASEAN neighbors on
one of the most important security concerns for the grouping and its members” (Bower
2012).5 Also adopting a more direct approach, language in CCP sanctioned press reports
on the Philippines and Vietnam clearly highlights Beijing’s preference for bilateral talks.
People’s Daily articles repeatedly reinforce a variation of the statement that the “right
track of negotiations” is “bilateral agreements” (China Lashes 2015).6 According to this
logic, China has separate disputes with each country and there should therefore be settled
independent of other influences.
Appeals for international support

5

This factors into the Chinese cultural idea of dealing with intermediaries instead of directly with the
disputing party. It is typical in Chinese culture to deal indirectly with the opponent (Gao 1995).
6
This preference for bilateral negotiations is not unique to the post 2010 time period. In 2004 during
negotiations to create specific measures to be included in the DOC, Beijing rejected the ASEAN policy of
ASEAN countries meeting before consulting with China (Hyer 2015, 256).
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Second, Beijing has made it clear countries should not appeal for international
help—particularly from the U.S. Xi Jinping’s 2014 call for “Asian people to uphold
Asia’s security” is seen as a thinly veiled warning to the U.S. to refrain from building
military alliances with Southeast Asian countries (Ng 2019).7 China’s diplomatic actions
have supported this assertion. This is part of China’s greater objective of increasing its
soft and hard power globally, and not specific to South China Sea disputes. Since 2014,
Beijing has held numerous summits and created infrastructure to increase regional
influence. While such efforts are prolific, notable initiatives include the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Forum on Chinese
African Cooperation. More specifically in the South China Sea, the official stance is that
since the South China Sea is sovereign territory, the U.S. is meddling in China’s domestic
affairs. People’s Daily articles repeatedly condemn efforts to seek help from the U.S.,
using the idiom “fox seeking power by riding the back of a tiger” (Hu Jia Hu Wei, 狐假
虎威) to criticize the Philippines for drawing support from the U.S (Xinhua 2015).8

Some see this call as an echo of early 20th century Japan’s call for an “Asia for Asians” (Chin 2014).
This is the exact translation of the idiom from the English version of the People’s Daily article. In my
opinion, the Baidu dictionary captures the essence of the idiom more accurately as “borrowing power to do
evil.”
7
8
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Beijing also condemns involvement from the wider international community. This
is best illustrated through
Beijing’s reaction to the widely

in favor of the Philippines. In a
survey of over 300 People’s
Daily articles, dates

Frequency

publicized 2016 UNCLOS ruling

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Frequency of threatening the
potential use of force against the
Philippines in People's Daily articles

Spring 2014

Summer 2015

Spring 2016

corresponding with events
related to the UNCLOS arbitration (when it was announced, submitted and the decision
made) incurred harsh responses from Beijing. Statements included strong warnings such
as “China reserves the right to further [military] actions,” “attempts…are doomed to
failure,” “no choice but to respond,” and “unlikely to walk away with impunity” (Xinhua
2014, 2016). By discouraging ASEAN from both working together and with non-ASEAN
countries, China “lets the enemy’s spy sow discord in the enemy’s camp,” or undermines
the enemy’s ability to fight by disunifying the opposition (Fan Jian Ji, 反间计).
Drilling for oil independently
Separately, Beijing has also clearly signaled that ASEAN countries should not
drill for oil independent of China’s help. Russia’s oil giant Rostnef, India’s Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh, and Japan Drilling Co. have all been rebuked
by China for drilling, or considering drilling, in disputed Vietnamese territory (Trickett
2018). Beijing has made itself clear through both rhetorical and military actions. Every
joint statement between Vietnam and China between 2011-2017 has included text about
“steady…and joint development” in exploring disputed territory in the South China Sea
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(Chubb 2017). In 2018, Manila and Beijing signed the Memorandum of Understanding of
Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, an agreement that the Philippines should not
drill for oil without Chinese cooperation (Ng 2018). However, these statements were
simply rhetorical affirmations of what had already been militarily asserted. Vietnam has
halted drilling in offshore oil and gas projects in 2017, 2018 and 2019 because of military
actions by China—most recently, Beijing sent a geological survey vessel and armed
escort vessels into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone which the US State Department
argues was intended to intimidate and send a message of deterrence to Hanoi (Reed
2019).
Clarity in Military Tactics
In the military sphere, Beijing’s “salami” and “cabbage” strategies of gaining and
maintaining territory signal clear intentions. In general literature about manipulative
decision making, the “salami” tactic is a type of policy entrapment characterized by
“breaking down the novel course of action into a series of gradual policy options” (Maoz
1990, 90). It is a way to make a “policy group…accept a commitment which would have
been rejected out of hand had the full implications and full extent of the project been
revealed from the start” (Stern 2003, 68). In the military sphere, a variation of this salami
tactic is employed in the South China Sea by, instead of a blitzkrieg or sudden warfare
move, China patiently uses small actions that add up to a major strategic shift. This
establishes the “impression” of sovereignty and traditional indicators of state authority,
such as the establishment of military bases and bureaucratic regulations and makes U.S.
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allied operations more costly, creating the appearance of a decreased presence (Haddick
2014).9
Similarly, the “cabbage” strategy, or what a paper published by the National
Defense University calls “leading from behind,” characterizes a non-dualistic approach.
The controversial yet popular PLA rear admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠) summarized
this tactic in a 2013 TV interview with Chinese State media:
…we have begun to take measures to seal and control the areas around the
Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal], seal and control continuously up till now.
In the year period since then, there have been fishermen in the inside…The
fishermen conduct normal production there. In the area around the island, fishing
administration ships and marine surveillance ships are conducting normal patrols
while in the outer ring there are navy warships. The island is thus wrapped layer
by layer like a cabbage. As a result, a cabbage strategy has taken shape. If the
Philippines wants to go in, in the outermost area, it has first to ask whether our
navy will allow it. Then it has to ask whether our fishery administration and
marine surveillance ships will allow it. Therefore, our fishermen can carry out
their production safely while our country’s marine rights and interests as well as
sovereignty are safeguarded. Is that not satisfactory? (Hill 2013).
Not directly declaring red lines should not be confused with strategic ambiguity as
China’s intentions and presence in the South China Sea are overt. While these strategies
may seem to employ a measure of ambiguity because they refrain from directly declaring
boundaries, these strategies do not shroud intentions. These tactics are a roundabout way
of acquiring territory which complements rhetorical strategic ambiguity as it distinctly
signals to ASEAN countries that it intends to expand sovereignty.

9

This tactic of delaying enforcement is one of three strategies a state can adopt to manage territorial claims.
First, a state can adopt a policy of cooperation, such as Duterte’s Philippines and a traditionally reticent and
quiet Malaysia. Second, a state can escalate the situation, either engaging in coercive diplomacy or forcibly
seizing contested land. Escalation can be deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental (Kahn 1965, 96). Third, a
state can engage a delaying strategy by maintaining a state’s claim without offering concessions or force
(Fravel 2011, 297).
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STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
Strategic ambiguity is a deliberate lack of clarity in rhetoric and actions with the
intention to gain a relative advantage over another state and avoid conflict. To illustrate
the advantages and drawbacks of such a strategy, it is useful to examine U.S. strategic
ambiguity toward the Taiwan strait issue. On one hand, strategic ambiguity towards
Taiwan acts as a “dual deterrence” policy or “deterrence by uncertainty.” Since Taiwan is
uncertain about potential U.S. engagement should conflict occur, Taiwan is more hesitant
to engage in aggressive behavior as the U.S. could potentially not offer sufficient support
(Pan 2003, 291). At the same time, ambiguity also deters China from acting aggressively
for fear of the U.S. backing Taiwan. In contrast to Taiwan’s less aggressive behavior,
clear rhetoric indicating the U.S. would back Japan in the case of conflict has ennobled
Japan to act more aggressively (Koda 2016; 34). On the other hand, some argue strategic
ambiguity fosters a negative feedback cycle of an arms race fueled by insecurity, leading
to policy failures evident in the 1995-1996 crisis where China held military exercises
within 35 miles from ports in Taiwan, causing panic in Taiwan and US intervention (Pan
2003). On the whole, strategic ambiguity is not a solution to the Taiwan issue but a
temporary tactic that has successfully kept peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait
(Benson and Niou 2001).10 China seeks these benefits of deterrence and maintaining the
status quo of peace from adopting this policy in the South China Sea.

10

The U.S. has traditionally also employed ambiguity towards the Philippines in the South China Sea.
China pointed this out through a 2012 China Daily article: “Without doubt, if the Philippines gets support
from the US and other countries it will take an even tougher approach in the future. The Philippines has a
very good plan, with only one drawback: neither the US nor any of its other allies are its puppets. Actually,
the alliance between the US and the Philippines is typical of an alliance between a big power and a small
country, in which the big power fears being dragged into a conflict not of its choosing, while the small
country fears being sacrificed in the interests of its powerful ally. The US wants to make use of China's
disputes with its neighbors to contain and balance China, but it does not want to become involved in any
direct military conflict with China. Its recent promise of not "taking sides" bears testimony to this policy.”
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Studying strategic ambiguity adds to the discussion of China’s behavior because it
directly addresses the weaknesses of exclusively relying on realist theory.11 Realism
explains the world in terms of power instead of the multi-dimensionality of how the
world actually is (Goldstein 2011, 43). This precludes factors such as area knowledge,
cost-benefit analysis, power transition theory and economic interdependence—all
considerations which heavily influence China’s decisions (Fravel 2010, Johnston 2003).12
In attempting to address this weakness, realism has resulted in dozens of schools
which fail to agree on the extent to which a state should engage in power seeking
behavior. Take structural or neo-realists. Within this school alone, strict defensive realists
argue states should only seek the minimum amount of power needed to ensure survival;
modified defensive realists argue states expand because of domestic influences; and
offensive realists claim the greatest guarantor of security is hegemony (Freyberg-Inan,
Harrison and James 2009, 109-112). Institutionalists, constructivist, and skeptics within
realism itself criticize neo-realism by contending it ignores human nature and foreign
policymaking independent of structural considerations. Post-modern realists are moving
towards forms of realism that introduce greater structural complexity to provide a
systemic account of domestic and international relationships to explain anomalies (James
2002, 195). Post-modern realism begins by recognizing the complex and imprecise
relationship between language and action. Indeed, some would even argue that post-

Studying strategic ambiguity supplements—not supplants—the role of realist theory in analyzing China’s
strategy. After all, strategic ambiguity is a strategy, not a theory. Furthermore, traditional Chinese
thought—which has helped guide current Chinese governance—finds its roots in the deeply realist
philosophies of legalism. Clearly, significant portions of realist theory are of value. Realism has provided
the most reliable guidance for statecraft and has consistently offered the most compelling explanations of
state behavior (Frankel 1996, 63).
12
Indeed, there is “little evidence of vigorous balancing by China against the U.S., vigorous balancing
against China by weaker states, a vigorous Chinese effort to replace U.S, hegemony, or vigorous U.S.
efforts to contain China’s rise” (Johnston 2012, 59).
11
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modern realism is simply neo-classical realism as it analyzes political rhetoric “as a
persuasive discourse rather than as a positive theory” (Beer and Hariman 2009, 10).
Despite this plethora of ideas, they all fail to account for cultural behavior and
holistically explain China’s behavior. Even proponents of realism argue that realist
international theory needs to be studied in conjunction with domestic politics and through
a reciprocity model of how states respond to other states’ actions (Frankel 1996, 63; 248).
Strategic ambiguity addresses both of these concerns as it is employed both on domestic
and international levels and often in response to other states’ actions (Chubb 2017). It can
be seen as a facet of area knowledge which can supplement realist explanations as it
provides a link between China’s domestic culture with its foreign policy. Drawing upon
George Friedman’s elaboration of a grand strategy as something “embedded in a nation’s
DNA…and appear[ing] so natural and obvious that politicians and generals are not
always aware of it,” ambiguity and implicit communication (Han Xu, 含蓄) play into
China’s cultural idea of “maintaining face” (Friedman 2009, 39). It is generally accepted
that it is a traditional Chinese tenant of communication that meaning lies beyond the
words and in the unspoken ideas (Yi Zai Yan Wai, 意在言外). From a cultural perspective
then, ambiguity could be seen less as an intentional tactic and more a cultural product that
can contribute to our understanding of China’s motivations.13

Just as realism is insufficient in examining China’s behavior towards ASEAN, it is also insufficient in
examining ASEAN’s behavior towards China. Scholars argue the response of ASEAN countries to Chinese
behavior has progressed past the structural realist ideas of either bandwagoning with or balancing against
China. Instead, these countries practice hedging, or engage in a “flexible strategy involving soft balancing,
economic engagement, and limited bandwagoning” (Ross 2006; Goh 2008; Wu 2019).
13
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BEIJING EXERCISES RHETORICAL AMBIGUITY
While China is clear about its expectations for its neighbors, China has made its
own claims and intentions blurry through conflicting messages, unclear rhetorical and
incremental military gains. Beijing clouds its intentions through the incongruity between
diplomatic and official rhetoric with actions on the ground.
Three examples—among many—serve to illustrate this point. First, in 2015
President Xi publicly asserted to President Obama he would “not militarize artificial
islands that Beijing has been building in the disputed South China Sea” (Page 2015).
Within two years of this reassurance, Beijing had placed military aircraft on all three of
China’s airstrips in the Spratly island (AMTI 2018). Second, there is disconnect between
what Filipino President Duterte reports President Xi tells him and official People’s Daily
rhetoric. In 2017, Duterte claimed that Xi Jinping directly threatened war if the
Philippines drilled for oil in disputed territory (Mogato 2017). This seemed to directly
contradict government sanctioned PRC statements in People’s Daily. The language in
People’s Daily official statements on the state of relations between China and the
Philippines from 2016-2019 (including the period of time Duterte was complaining about
threats of war from China) was entirely positive, consistently referring to their
“inspiring…friendship.”14
The third example of how official rhetoric does not always match evidence from
the ground is the overwhelmingly positive official rhetoric directed towards Vietnam. A
survey of over 300 People’s Daily articles found that language directed towards Vietnam

People’s Daily articles are useful measures of CCP opinion as they reflect Beijing’s direct opinion as
Southeast Asian countries do not ignore China’s rhetoric and are careful to examine Beijing’s statements
(Lai 2017).
14
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between 2010 and 2019 focused on praising positive and close relations, with the
exception of the year 2015. This was despite obvious conflicts, such as Chinese vessels
firing water cannons at a Vietnamese fleet in 2014, Vietnam shipping mobile rocket
launchers to the Spratly Islands in 201615 and allowing an Indian oil company to explore
an oil block in 2018 (Gady 2016; Holmes 2016; Jennings 2019; Trickett 2018). This was
most likely attributable to the commitment of “Sino-Vietnamese friendship propaganda”
found in the 2011, 2013 and 2015 communiques between Beijing and Hanoi (Chubb
2017). While China has been clear about some issues—such as its displeasure with the
Philippines after the 2016 UNCLOS ruling through official channels—its rhetoric and
actions have been incongruous when dealing with other issues such as conveying its
opinion and intentions towards Vietnam.

Vietnam likely has shipped the rocket launchers, according to Reuters and Western officials. However,
the Vietnamese foreign ministry officially disputes this claim.
15
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Average intensity level of rhetoric in People's Daily
articles: 2010-2019
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Chart 1: Over 320 official statements found in People’s Daily articles (not
editorials) between 2010-2019 were arranged into four categories and the
values averaged. Level 1 included phrases indicating warm relations such
as “positive and productive,” “willing to work,” “golden opportunity.”
Level 2 included “urge,” “hamper regional peace,” “deterrence.” Level 3
included “warn,” “repeatedly and sternly demand,” and “stop.” Level 4
included “doomed,” “beware,” “attempts will backfire,” “unlikely to walk
away with impunity.”
Shifting Claims
While China is clear that issues of sovereignty in the South China Sea are of the utmost
importance, the claims themselves have shifted and not always been clearly articulated.
While China’s original claims were to the Spratlys (Nansha) and Paracels (Xisha), these
claims have shifted to include Macclesfield Bank, then incorporated the Scarborough
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Shoal as well even though it lies hundreds of miles from Macclesfield Bank (Poling
2012).16
Unclear
physical map
boundaries are yet
another illustration of
ambiguity in China’s
claims. In 2012, the
People’s Daily
announced the first
“complete and correct
map” had been
published by the PLA
General Staff
Department. A few

Map 1: The SinoMap official map of China, which includes
a tenth dash to incorporate Taiwan.

months later, SinoMaps, under the jurisdiction of State Bureau of Surveying and
Mapping, released another “official” map. This map detailed a ten-dash line with
different borders, much to the ire of the Philippines and Vietnam (Jakobson 2014; Callar
2016). Clearly, publishing conflicting maps does not automatically signal a shift in
policy. Inconsistency in maps was informally explained in a Time article by a Chinese
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These changes also undermine the historical claims China has to these islands--many of the newer claims
are not present on historical maps of China that Beijing claims legitimize their moves. 16 The Republic of
China (Taiwan) also makes historical claims to the islands. A fascinating chronology of these historical
claims can be found at: Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2016. Peace in the south china sea,
national territory secure forever. Policy paper on ROC south china sea policy. Taipei, Taiwan: David Y. L.
L
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scientist as a mistake by cartographers who were “not working that rigorously” and were
“not that strict” (Beech 2016). Regardless, the lack of clarity caused confusion for the
Philippines and Vietnam, particularly when claims have historically changed.
INTENTIONAL OR INCIDENTAL?
To what extent is this ambiguity intentional? Perhaps ambiguity is the net effect
of the unintentionally unwieldy arms of decision making working independently and
cultural norms which send an unclear picture of China’s intentions to other countries.
Some could argue insufficient clarity of vision on the domestic front leads to a lack of
clear messaging in the international arena. China’s overarching goals of a peaceful rise
and a multipolar world are well advertised, but the path to these objectives is muddy.
Structural defects that lead to an inflated bureaucracy and competing interest groups in
the Chinese government suggest this ambiguity is non-strategic and that authority over
foreign policy is increasingly fractured (Jakobson and Knox 2010, vii). Even with Xi
Jinping’s swift consolidation of power, no Chinese leader can condemn actions officially
taken to “safeguard China’s sovereignty” as publicly denouncing such an act would
display weakness (Jakobson 2014, 32). Actions taken from lower levels of government
conflict when there are inadequate active measures to unify disparate groups. However,
Beijing is aware of these issues and is actively attempting to rectify these structural issues
with reforms.17
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There is frustratingly sparse available academic information on the process of China’s military decisionmaking process, particularly informal processes. While researches such as Linda Jakobson research China’s
maritime actors and general informal decision making and Michael Swaine general PLA processes, both
heavily rely on inferences from policy processes in retrospect and personal interviews. Such researchers
also point out the difficulty of verifying what we know about these policy processes.
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Instructions given by the upper echelons of leadership are sweeping and avoid
specifics, which leads to a variety of interpretations. Broad guidance is given from the
Central Military Commission (CMC), or the top leadership of the PLA, chaired by Xi
Jinping. This guidance gives the “general direction,” while implementation and policy
formation is left to lower levels of government. One senior Chinese researcher
commented that “anything can be explained, either way” and that given the ephemeral
language of guiding Chinese foreign policy principles, guidelines can be used to justify
sometimes competing policy objectives. A clear example is illustrated through Xi’s
comments in 2012 to senior leadership in charge of maritime issues that he favored a
“determined response” to provocations of China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea
while stressing that this could not endanger stability (Jakobson 2014, 25-30). One could
see how such a statement could be used to back up a wide range of seemingly opposing
actions because of its lack of clarity.
Competing interest groups in the government and military
Contradicting directives leave much room for other parties and many layers of
bureaucracy between the decision makers and implementors to offer different
interpretations the broad foreign policy strokes painted by the top leaders. Before the
2014 PLA military reforms, the interest groups pushing for their own agendas in
maritime issues were referred to as the “nine dragons stirring up the sea” (Jiu Long Nao
Hai, 九龙闹海) by the Chinese media, in reference to a folk legend of the dragon king’s
nine sons stirring up the sea (International Crisis Group 2012, 8). In fact, the messy
tangle of government agencies each with overlapping interests in the SCS before the
2014 PLA reforms totaled more than nine, and included interests such as state-owned oil
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enterprises, senior military leaders, provincial leaders, the Chinese Coast Guard, foreign
ministry, PLAN, and the maritime militia (International Crisis Group 2012; Jakobson
2014).
Even within the military, there are competing facets which leads to redundancy
and competition. Typical to most militaries, each arm lacks clear direction in peace time,
leading the roles of each service to be only “relatively independent” (Zhang 2017, 4). The
Air Force (PLAAF), for instance, has been competing with the Naval Aviation, Army
Aviation, Navy Marine Corps and Strategic Support Force to increase operational
relevance by expanding into the maritime domain. Surprisingly, from 2013-2017, 17 of
22 overwater bomber flights were from PLAAF bombers while the rest were from Naval
Aviation showing that the PLAAF has, at least in part, succeeded in expanding their
range of capabilities at the expense of a different arm of the military (Cozad and
Beauchamp-Mustafaga 2017; McCaslin and Erickson 2019). This competition leads to
greater ambiguity because as uncertainty of the responsibilities and roles of each military
arm increases, it becomes increasingly more likely that this uncertainty could also lead to
ambiguous signaling outside of the military.
Bureaucratic muddling
Aside from the dozens of competing interest groups, there is also bureaucratic
inflation. Prior to the 2014 military reforms and consolidation of the PLAN and Coast
Guard, there were five civilian law enforcement agencies: the China Maritime Police,
China Maritime Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Maritime AntiSmuggling Bureau and Maritime Safety Administration. These agencies were plagued by
bureaucratic inefficiency and overlapping responsibilities, many of which were also
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addressed in the sweeping 2014 military reforms (National Institute 2019). The expansive
bureaucracy fosters uncertainty because different parties are uncoordinated. Thus,
overlapping and conflicting messages, illustrated in the example in the previous section
of the different map agencies publishing “official” maps with differing boundaries. This
applies not only to differing ideas of what should be pursued, but also to uncoordinated
technology. For instance, the Shanghai’s Rescue Coordination Center conceded in 2007
they could see local Maritime Safety Administration vehicles through their CCTV system
on the Huangpu River but could not readily display the location of coast guard vessels in
the same area (Goldstein 2010, 10). While this is a dated example, it illustrates that as
little as 12 years ago, the systems lacked centrality and coordination.
Beijing is addressing these concerns
However, Beijing is addressing the aforementioned deficiencies in governmental
structure that generate ambiguity. The 2014 military reforms were intended to solidify a
hierarchical decision-making structure. Take the Chinese Coast Guard assimilation into
the PLAN. As part of this reorganization, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), one of the
main forces that would engage in conflict, switched from reporting to civilian agencies to
reporting to working with the military administered People’s Armed Police (PAP) in
2018. This allowed the military to streamline its maritime management resources, and
placed the CCG under military control, suggesting a closer relationship with PLAN,
making it easier for CCG to obtain PLAN vessels to conduct their patrols, and decrease
competition between the two arms (Lin 2019). Indeed, in a Ningbo Academy study,
scholars expressed that “internally, many scholars believe that maritime power means
maritime military power, and maritime military power means the navy” (Lyle 2010, 23).
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By streamlining these organizations, the CCP decreases the likelihood of independent
actors functioning by themselves.
Subordination of the PLA to the CCP
Some point out that structure is not strategy: just because the military is reforming
to create greater command and control does not mean the overall strategy is less
ambiguous. However, establishing the PLA is firmly situated under the CCP eliminates
the possibility that China’s ambiguity is a primary consequence of structural deficiencies.
The military is a subordinate of the CMC, which guarantees the “Communist Party’s
absolute leadership of the military.” A senior PLA officer in 2007 commented that “the
PLA made great sacrifices for Chinese economic modernization for two decades. It was
asked to have patience, and it obeyed without complaints,” emphasizing the distinctly
subordinate position of the PLA to the CCP. PLA officers in leading small groups are
typically primarily present to relay information, not to form policy, and there are dozens
of competing bodies feeding into the decision-making process, only one of which is the
PLA (Jakobson and Manuel 2016, 104).18 Since the PLA naturally tends to have a more
hawkish perspective of issues of sovereignty, this helps override hard lined emotionally
driven factions within the army with more moderate voices in Party leadership for
decisions deemed important enough to require top level decision making (Zhou 2008,
111-114; Shirk 2007, 9). Furthermore, there have traditionally been few military
representatives on the politburo standing committee. There was not a single military
officer on the Politburo standing committee during Hu Jintao’s first term. Factions within
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“Leading small groups . . . are sometimes referred to by the leadership as ‘advisory bodies’ for the PB or
Party Secretariat, and their decisions are often issued in the name of those bodies. However, they can also
bring finished policy packages to the party leading organs at times and can sometimes issue orders and
instructions directly to line departments and units” (Swaine 1998).
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top level leadership has been frowned upon. For instance, Yang Shangkun and Yang
Baibing, a former vice chairman of the CMC and secretary general of the CMC, were
dismissed in 1992 allegedly for organizing a clique (Zhou 2008, 113).19 Thus, the CCP
has been attempting to lessen the muddling effects that come with large bureaucratic
organizations and competing interests.
Ambiguity as a Cultural Byproduct
An alternative argument is that China is unintentionally ambiguous because it is
the outward expression of a cultural standard. As the classic idiom expresses it, one must
muddy the water to catch the fish (Hun Shui Mo Yu, 浑水摸鱼). Opportunity for
flexibility, and ambiguity by extension, is a tenant of good governance in Chinese
philosophical thought. Thus, ambiguity in Chinese foreign affairs stems from traditional
philosophies of governance and Chinese interpersonal practices and is more a cultural
norm than an intentional tactic.
Good governance in Chinese philosophical thought includes vagueness to
accommodate for changing needs. Take Xunzi and Legalism as examples. Xunzi, a
Confucian philosopher during the Warring States period, argued that explicit standards
should be vague so that the manner in which they should be implemented is open to
interpretation (Angle 2017). According to Xunzi, “there are people who create order;
there are no standards creating order of themselves.” Xunzi shows how vagueness leads
to greater flexibility in governance through an analogy of trying to cross a river in a boat:
The rules are like the boat and the people [i.e. the ruler and his officials] are like
the steersman. If the boat is damaged and the rudder is
broken…everyone…understands that the boat cannot get across. So…it is
19

While these examples are dated, they show the traditional attitude towards having military leaders in
policy making positions and the negative sentiment towards organizing cliques reminiscent of a post-Mao
order.
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necessary to reform the rules. There has never been a case where one could
successfully restore order without reforming the rules (HHJ pp. 23–24).
The Legalist Han Feizi agrees that a good ruler must adapt to the times and not be
stuck in tradition. While the “underlying patterns” may remain, their specific applications
should evolve with the times (Angle 2017). Indeed, the Legalist text advocates
pragmaticism for “… if one finds gains will exceed losses, one goes ahead with them”
(HFZ ch. 47).20 Thus, in both Xunzi’s pessimistic view of humankind and the legalist’s
political realist perspective, vagueness is necessary for effective governance.
A classic contemporary political example of this is Deng Xiaoping’s evaluation of
Mao Zedong. Following Mao’s death, there was implicit but not overt criticism of his
governing tactics. Deng declared that Mao’s legacy, which included the disastrous Great
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, was “seventy percent right and thirty percent
wrong” (Qi San Kai, 七三开). While radically assertive for the political climate of the
time, instead of directly pointing out Mao’s mistakes, Deng showed restraint and gave a
general assessment that could be interpreted many ways.
Aside from philosophical thought, vagueness is a quality of Chinese interpersonal
communications. Handbooks on Chinese culture advise Westerners not to directly
express intentions and instead employ indirect communication tactics (Gao 1995;
Hofstede 2016). Of course, Chinese culture is constantly evolving, but according to
traditional thinking the concept of implicit communication (Han Xu, 含蓄) is considered
a “social rule” in Chinese culture and involves leaving the “unspoken” to the listeners
(Yu and Gu 1990; Gao 1998). Indeed, “assertiveness does not have the positive
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Of course, legalism also advocates for clear laws and punishments, but this is separate from vague
overarching principles and doctrines.
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connotations found in other cultures. Being assertive reflects the ill character of an
individual and threatens the harmony and cohesion of interpersonal relationships” (Gao
1998).21
Therefore, it logically follows that the Chinese would adopt their interpersonal
tactics when communicating with the regional community. Neither is this unique to
Chinese culture. Perhaps in reaction to China’s ambiguity or because of a general Asian
tendency towards vagueness in communication, ASEAN countries themselves adopt
similar communication methods—the “ASEAN way” involves dealing with Southeast
Asian customs of conflict resolution which include aversion and ambiguity (Acharya
2009; Kivimaki 2011). ASEAN responds to China’s aggressive signals by “send[ing]
ambiguous signals related to similar security interests” to great powers (Lim and Cooper
2015; Wu 2019). Since the parties involved adopt this method of communication, it
raises the possibility that ambiguity is the modus operandi and not a tactic that has been
specifically sought out.22
AMBIGUITY: A DELIBERATE TACTIC DESIGNED TO MEET SPECIFIC GOALS
China’s ambiguity is not uniform. As discussed earlier, China has clearly
articulated what it expects ASEAN countries to do and the importance of sovereignty
issues to its national agenda. Rather, ambiguity is employed in situations when it furthers
China’s goal of peacefully expanding in the South China Sea by fostering anxiety which
destabilizes the opposition and increases flexibility. While positive consequences do not
21

Being assertive in actions, I might add, differs from assertiveness in rhetoric. I am not attempting to
downplay the level of assertiveness Beijing has displayed in its military incidents with its Southeast Asian
neighbors, but rather point out how interconnected culture and politics are.
22
This does not mean ASEAN countries appreciate ambiguity from China. A CSIS report on an ASEAN
meeting in 2012 reports there was “little appetite for vague pronouncements of Chinese policy and
justifications…and [ASEAN] is frustration with the perpetual uncertainty created by a Chinese policy that
amounts to avoiding taking a position at all costs” (Poling 2012).
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prove intentionality, the benefits that come from ambiguity provide evidence that
ambiguity could be intentional.
Anxiety
Anxiety is a form of manipulation designed to destabilize the opposition and give
the aggressor greater flexibility. Indeed, ontological international relations commonly
differentiates between fear and anxiety. Whereas fear has “a definite object of focus,
anxiety is a more ambiguous state of unease, an affect that arises when identity is
challenged or in flux” (Steele 2008, 51; Rumelili 2015, 12).
Ambiguity fosters anxiety on both the domestic and international level.
Refraining from using dualistic thinking is an integral part of conducting “political
opinion warfare” (Xin Li Zhan, 心理战) and “psychological warfare” (Yu Lun Zhan, 舆论
战) in domestic propaganda (Walton 2012). Rhetorical contradictions between public
statements made by “military hawks” and peace promoting MFA personnel in Chinese
propaganda create a “push pull” effect between hardline and conciliatory rhetoric.
Indeed, Major-General Luo has used a Peking opera analogy in an online QQ forum to
explain:
some [PLA figures] sing the white mask [villain role] and others sing the red
mask [honest minister]. It can even be a mixture of truth and deceit, real and fake,
transparent when transparency is called for, secret when transparency is not called
for, all with the core strategic interests of the state as the highest
consideration…engendering a sense of anxiety is one of our aims.
Why engender a sense of anxiety? Ambiguity allows the PLA to exchange red lines
for blurry ones. As Andrew Chubb writes, “Rather than…establishing a red line of resolve
to fight in a specific scenario, channeling and risk management of nationalist sentiment
deters opposition by raising a remote but plausible chance of uncontrollable escalation
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across an unspecified set of circumstances” (Chubb 2017, 275; emphasis in original). This
allows the CCP to increase the public’s “maritime consciousness”（Hai Yang Yi Shi, 海洋
意 识） and tightly control nationalistic sentiment (Bradshaw and Howard 2019; Luo
General 2013).
More anxiety means less accountability
Ambiguity gives China greater flexibility, which provides room to improvise or
wiggle out of potentially provocative statements and movements, consequently avoiding
conflict. Two points illustrate this idea. First, China has not historically stated specific
claims. Specifically, as of 2015 it had not explicitly stated which reefs it considered to be
surrounded by 12 nautical mile territorial seas (Chubb 2015). In the ensuing years, China
has overtly delineated its claims by militarizing specific reefs. By not publishing these
exact claims beforehand, China could adopt to the shifting attitudes and gauge the reactions
of other players before acting. The constant evolution of opinions and policies allows
Beijing to use its strategy of ambiguity to outlast frequent turnovers of power. In the
Philippines for instance, even if Benigno Aquino’s government (2010-2016) was strongly
anti-China, Beijing had only to wait for the Duterte government’s pro-China policies to
realize the benefits of its “salami” strategy.23 Ambiguity then, is a useful component of a
long term vision and end goals characteristic of Chinese foreign policy objectives.
Second, ambiguity creates a safety net for potentially provocative actions and
allows China to “test the waters” and send messages to other countries. A 1978 fishing
boat incident with Japan provides a useful illustration. In the midst of friendship
23

One could also make a strong case here that Aquino’s anti-China rhetoric was futile. Regardless of
Filipino policy, China’s salami strategy was active during Aquino’s government, such as with the Filipino
coast guard standoff at the Second Thomas Shoal. If anything, the UNCLOS arbitration (initiated by
Aquino’s government) embarrassed China and did nothing but harden their stance.
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negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing, approximately forty boats with signs reading
“The Diaoyu Islands are the territory of the People’s Republic of China” entered disputed
waters. The same day, China withdrew the fishing boats in response to Japan’s demands.
Later, the Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao dismissed the incident by asserting the boats
were “chasing fish around the island” and that it was an “accident.” Here, ambiguous
statements messaged to Japan that China was willing to set aside issues to achieve the
larger foreign policy goal of counterbalancing the Soviet threat by normalizing relations
with Japan (Hyer 2015, 185-189). While the example is outdated, it clearly shows how
flexibility was pragmatic on a microlevel—by allowing them to message to Japan their
willingness to shelve the issue, and on a macrolevel—by showing they could put aside
differences to help achieve the larger goal of normalization.
Ambiguity also forces the burden of decision making upon other claimants. Since
the Chinese are already operating in violation of the designated 200-mile exclusive
economic zone in countries such as the Philippines, at what point should strong action be
taken? Because China’s gains are incremental, other countries have to decide what would
be considered the first provocation that triggers a strong response action. Of course,
ASEAN countries are painfully aware of the asymmetric relationship and economic costs
when considering whether to take action against China, but the gradual nature of China’s
gains with blurry ends makes its actions appear modest instead of flagrant (Womack
2006).
Furthermore, ambiguity gives the PLAN greater freedom to perform controversial
tasks such as enforcing maritime claims without soiling the PLA’s reputation (Kennedy
and Erickson 2017, 4). This is illustrated through the 2019 Reed Bank Incident. In June, a
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Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Filipino fishing vessel riding an anchor in disputed
waters.24 The Chinese fishing vessel promptly left after the collision and had no traceable
signal, leaving 22 Filipino fishermen in a drowning vessel. The fishermen were later
rescued by a passing Vietnamese boat. This event provoked intense reactions from the
Filipino population (Castro 2019; Seeking Clues 2019). Was this collision from a Chinese
vessel deliberate signaling from the maritime militia or a misguided fishing vessel? 25 On
one hand, it was possible it was a maritime militia vessel since maritime militia vessels are
often refurbished fishing vessels and are manned by civilians available for mobilization,
which disguises the affiliation of the boats (Secretary of Defense 2019, 18-54). The dual
nature of the ship would explain why their signal was turned off after the event. On the
other hand, it could have been an inexperienced crew of illegally fishing fishermen whose
signal went dark after the event because of the illicit nature of their activities. In the absence
of clear and direct evidence that it was a premeditated attack from the Chinese, complaints
from the Philippines to China could be downplayed as an “ordinary maritime accident”
(Reuters 2019). Ambiguity then, is a screen that China can hide behind as it tests reactions
and asserts itself.
CONCLUSION
The principle question remaining is how the United States and other claimants
should respond to China’s strategic ambiguity. ASEAN claimants are currently
countering China’s claims with both reluctant acceptance and strategic ambiguity of their
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This Filipino investigation into the incident also does not paint the fishermen in the best light. The report
indicates the fishing license was expired, the engine officer was unlicensed, and there was no light on the
boat and no lookout as the crew was asleep—except for the cook who was making rice (Galvez 2019).
25
An October 2019 AMTI report concludes that the Chinese vessel was likely an illegal fishing vessel (see
Seeking Clues in the Case of Yuemaobinyu 42212).
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own. While this has resulted in a diplomatic rhetorical dance that has maintained relative
stability, it has not resolved the disputes. How can ASEAN both help maintain the peace
while asserting sovereignty of their own? What role can and should the United States
play in this struggle for sovereignty?
China arguably currently has the most articulately defined goals and grand
strategy of any nation (Erickson 2019, 73). Its military actions clearly indicate China
intends to continue expanding sovereignty, but precise intentions and the intended extent
of expanding sovereignty is unclear. What is certain is that strategic ambiguity in
maritime disputes is not a new idea—a policy of rhetorical strategic ambiguity is a
strategy of pragmaticism and flexibility. These are tenants of traditional Chinese thought
and have been the principle driving force behind Chinese foreign policy since the 1980s.
Indeed, strategic ambiguity is the expression of a pragmatic mindset. China’s strategic
ambiguity has successfully allowed China to accomplish two seemingly opposing goals:
expansion and peace. In other words, this ambiguity allows China to increase its control
over the South China Sea without provoking a military response from other claimants.
While critics may point out the gathering challenges China faces in realizing their
ambitious maritime aims, China is still more coordinated and unified than its smaller
neighbors. China’s relative strategic clarity strongly suggests China does not plan to
“rejuvenate” in a disorganized or discombobulated manner, for China’s ambiguity is
calculated, deliberate and strategic.
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